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IMMIGRATION: Two YEARS IN REVIEW
Chantal Tie and Michael Bossin*
RESUMt
Dans cet article, les auteurs 6tudient les d~veloppements en ce qui a trait a la loi sur
l'immigration suite h l'61ection, il y a deux ans, d'un gouvemement lib6ral f6d6ral.
En tant qu'avocats sp6cialis6s dans le droit des pauvres, les auteurs mettent l'accent
sur les changements dans le droit des r6fugi6s et les demandes d'admission se
fondant sur des motifs humanitaires et de compassion. Un examen des r6centes
d6cisions de la Cour qui ont port6 sur l'acc~s des immigrants la justice accom-
pagne le sommaire des changements l6gislatifs et de politiques.
A. INTRODUCTION
On February 27, 1995, Fatimeh received the good news that she had been
accepted as a Convention refugee in Canada. That evening, the night of the
Federal budget, the bad news came. Effective immediately, adults applying for
permanent residence in Canada were subject to a Right of Landing Fee. The fee
was $975 per adult applicant and would be applied to those determined to be
Convention refugees. It was to be paid up front and in addition to the regular
processing fees, which all immigrants must pay. For Fatimeh and her son the
total cost of application and landing was $1,575.00.
For Fatimeh, a single mother recently arrived in Canada and on welfare, the
Right of Landing Fee imposed a genuine hardship. To other low-income im-
migrants, particularly those in two-adult families, the fee has become a serious
impediment to landing. Independent applicants, entrepreneurs, or persons im-
migrating to Canada from developed countries, can afford to pay the new fee.
The same is not true for most refugees and persons coming from "third world"
countries, or those who seek landing on humanitarian and compassionate
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grounds. To them, the Right of Landing Fee is not merely an additional
administrative expense, it is a significant barrier. Reviving memories of the
methods used by Canada to severely limit Chinese immigration in the nineteenth
and early part of the twentieth century, the new fee has been referred to by its
critics as "the head tax". 1
The imposition of the Right of Landing Fee is simply one example of how this
last year has been a disappointing one for low-income immigrants to Canada.
At the same time that this country has introduced measures to encourage the
immigration of skilled workers and professionals, those programs designed to
benefit refugees and humanitarian applicants have failed to meet initial expec-
tations. Meanwhile, Court decisions have had a serious impact on such matters
as the duty of fairness in humanitarian applications, change of country condi-
tions in refugee claims and access to justice. What follows is a discussion of the
most noteworthy examples of this trend from the past two years.
B. HUMANITARIAN AND COMPASSIONATE APPLICATIONS
1. Post Determination Refugee Claimants in Canada
Class ("PDRCC")
Beginning on February 1, 1993, all failed refugee claimants have received a
post-determination review of their claim. The review, conducted by an Immigra-
tion officer, was meant to provide a type of "safety net" for those claimants who,
although having been refused by the Immigration and Refugee Board ("IRB"),
still faced an "objectively identifiable risk".2 In May 1994, the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration announced that all refugee claimants whose claims
had been refused between February 1, 1993 and May 20, 1994 would now be
eligible for a second "post-determination" review.
The problem with the "old" PDRCC review was that it was not a very effective
safety net. The program was strongly criticized in a report made to the Minister
by Susan Davis and Lome Waldman, The Quality of Mercy.3 The authors noted
that, under the old system, the acceptance rate for claimants across the country
1. See, for example, Sharry Aiken, "A Return to the Abhorrent Head Tax", Spring, 1995
Refugee Update, 1995.
2. Immigration Regulations, SOR/78-172, s.2. [hereinafter Immigration Regulations]
3. S. Davis and L. Waldman, The Quality of Mercy: A study of the processes available to
persons who are determined not to be refugees and who seek humanitarian and com-
passionate treatment. (March 1994), Study submitted to The Honourable Sergio
Marchi, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada.
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was less than 1%. According to Davis and Waldman, this low rate made the
entire review meaningless.
One reason so few cases were accepted under the "old PDRCC" was that the
standard was very high and the risk faced by the applicant had to be personalized
to the individual. This standard was far higher than the "well-founded fear of
persecution" test used by the IRB in deciding refugee claims. In the opinion of
some advocates, the PDRCC criteria were construed so narrowly that the
successful applicant was the person who could provide the bullet with her name
on it.
The definition of "member of the post-determination refugee claimants in
Canada class" contained in the Immigration Regulations did not change after
May 20, 1994. One still had to show that the "objectively identifiable risk ...
would apply in every part of the country, and would not be faced generally by
other individuals in or from that country". 4 There was, however, to be a more
generous interpretation of the criteria. Specifically, the phrase "... would not be
faced generally by other individuals ..." was "not restricted to a risk personal-
ized to an individual; rather it included risks faced by individuals that may be
shared by others who are similarly situated."5
This more expansive approach to interpreting the regulation, although prompted
by criticism of the original program, was also consistent with judicial commen-
tary on such rigid criteria. In Abdirizak Yusuf Muse v. Canada (Solicitor
General),6 for example, the Federal Court Trial Division quashed a decision of
Canada Immigration that a Somali man would not face unduly harsh or inhu-
mane treatment if returned to his country.
In that case, the applicant had not shown he "would be at greater risk than
anyone else in the general population under the prevailing country condi-
tions".(emphasis added)7 By imposing such a "rigid requirement which was
inconsistent with the intent of the Immigration Act and the Ministerial stan-
dard", 8 the officer had fettered his discretion. Although Muse deals with an
application made under section 114 (2) of the Immigration Act,9 the criteria of
"unduly harsh or inhumane treatment" is similar to that set out in the PDRCC
4. Supra, note 2 at s.2.
5. PDRCC Interpretive Guidelines (1994) [hereinafter PDRCC Guidelines].
6. (1993), 22 Imm. L.R. (2d) 276.
7. Ibid. at 277.
8. Ibid. at 278.
9. Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, s.49(1)(i). [hereinafter Immigration Act].
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definition of risk to the immigrant's life, "extreme sanctions" or "inhumane
treatment". 10
The Minister's acknowledgement that all post-determination reviews done prior
to May 20, 1994 were essentially inadequate was a welcome and encouraging
development. Indeed, at the time of the announcement of the second review,
there was hope that a fairer, more generous approach would henceforth be taken
in post-claim reviews. Regrettably, the "new PDRCC" has proved to be little
different from the "old PDRCC", at least in terms of the rate of successful
applications. Currently, the rate of acceptance is about 5% across Canada, an
increase from the earlier 1% level, but still very low.
One reason for the slightly higher acceptance rate could simply be that in those
cases affected by the Minister's announcement a significant amount of time had
passed since the IRB decision. In some cases, there may have been a significant
change of circumstances in the country, or in the circumstances of the individual
applicant.
For IRB decisions made after May 20th, 1994, PDRCC reviews continue to be
conducted. In these cases, applications must be submitted 15 days after receipt
of the Board decision, or the decision of the Federal Court, whichever comes
later. Where leave to commence a judicial review is denied, as are most leave
applications, only a few months would normally have passed between the IRB
decision and a PDRCC application. Since the criteria applied in the PDRCC are
very similar to those in the refugee hearing, a re-evaluation several months later
is not likely to garner a different result.
As well, although Post Claim Determination Officers ("Officers") often deal
with complex matters similar to those considered in a refugee claim, they are
not trained at the same level, nor to the same degree, as Refugee Board members.
In some cases, the quality of the decision-making in PDRCC applications
reflects the lack of expertise and training of the officers. That being said, it would
appear that in judicial reviews of such decisions, the Federal Court is reluctant
to interfere with the reasoning of these officers. In Gharib v. Minister of
Citizenship & Immigration,"l for example, the Officer refused the PDRCC
application on the grounds that the applicant had an internal flight alternative
(IFA) in Lebanon. In her analysis, there was nothing to indicate that the officer
had considered the reasonableness of the IFA, although the guidelines for
interpreting the PDRCC regulation suggests that Officers must consider the
issue of reasonableness in a "sensitive, culturally aware, flexible and judicious
10. Supra, note 2 at s.2.
11. (September 13, 1995) No. IMM-180-95, (Fed. T.D.)
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manner." 12 In his consideration of the judicial review of this decision, Mr.
Justice Noel, of the Federal Court Trial Division states:
... the decision of an immigration official not to recommend an individual
as being eligible for the PDRCC takes no right away. Thus, the Court will
not intervene in discretionary decisions of post-claim determination officers
unless such discretion can be shown to have been exercised pursuant to im-
proper purposes, irrelevant considerations, with bad faith, or in a patently
unreasonable manner. 13
Many PDRCC applications are rejected on the basis of publicly available human
rights reports and other similar documentation, which are not submitted by the
applicant. Where such materials are considered by the Officer, without disclo-
sure to the applicant, an issue arises at to whether the officer is acting unfairly,
by relying on "extrinsic evidence". In Jesbir Singh Klair v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship & Immigration),14 the Federal Court Trial Division found that
this question, raised on an application for a stay of removal, amounted to a
"serious issue", for the purposes of a stay.
In practice, PDRCC officers continue to place great emphasis and reliance upon
the negative decision of the Refugee Board. To overcome the reasoning in those
decisions generally requires the applicant to produce new evidence which
contradicts the factual findings made by the Board. To do so demands consid-
erable time effort and expertise, none of which is currently covered by the
Ontario Legal Aid Plan. Given the high standards to be met in the PDRCC and
the low percentage of successful applications, the outlook for potential appli-
cants remains discouraging.
2) "Deferred Removal Orders Class"
On July 7, 1994, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration announced the
creation of the Deferred Removal Orders Class ("DROC"). There was extensive
media coverage about his announcement, and, unfortunately, a great deal of
misinformation circulated among the failed refugee claimant population in
Canada. The announcement was extremely vague. The rumours varied from a
general amnesty for all failed refugee claimants to a right of landing for all
claimants who had been in Canada for three years. There was no general
amnesty, and the eligibility requirements for the class are much more restrictive
than merely having been in Canada for three years.
12. PDRCC Guidelines, supra, note 2 at 3.
13. Supra, note 11 at 6.
14. [1995] F.C.J. No. 935 (Q.L.)
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On November 4, 1994, some of the uncertainty around the Class was clarified
through the amendment to the Immigration Regulations which defined "member
of the deferred removal orders class". Part of the rationale for the creation of
the Class was to address the situation of many failed refugee claimants who had
made Canada their home over the years, forming attachments without obtaining
any status or security. In many cases, the removals were not being executed by
the Department because there was a moratorium on removals to certain war-tom
countries. Somalia and Sri Lanka were listed, as well as other countries where
there was reason to believe the person deported would suffer human rights
abuses if returned, such as the People's Republic of China and Iran. In other
cases removals could not be carried out because the failed refugee claimants had
applied to the Federal Court for a review of their negative refugee decisions,
which stayed the removal. With the announcement of the DROC, moratoriums
on removals to certain countries were lifted and Immigration stepped up expul-
sions, with the emphasis on those with criminal records and refugee claimants
most recently rejected.
To be eligible for membership in the DROC, a claimant must have made his or
her claim to be a Convention refugee on or after January 1, 1989. The person
must be in Canada and be subject to a removal order, 15 and at least three years
must have passed since the latest of:
- the making or issuance of any removal order; or,
- the date on which the refugee claim was rejected by the IRB, or the
person was found not to have a credible basis to their claim at inquiry
under the old section 46.03(5) of the Immigration Act. 16
Members of the refugee "Backlog" who made their claims prior to January 1,
1989 are excluded from the Class, even though these individuals have been
settled in Canada for longer than people who are included. Others are excluded
if they were never issued a removal order. For example, someone who came to
Canada on a visitor's visa and made a refugee claim while their visa was still
valid would not be eligible for DROC, even though it had been three years since
his or her claim was rejected.
In addition to the eligibility requirements, there are other hurdles which must
be cleared before applicants can be landed under the DROC program. Canada
Immigration originally took the position that applicants would have to have a
work history under a valid employment authorization for at least six months to
15. As these terms were defined in the Immigration Act before February 1, 1993.
16. Supra, note 9 at s.46.03(5).
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be included in the Class. After extensive lobbying, the government changed its
position to enable applicants to fulfil the employment requirement after they
had met the other eligibility criteria. The hardship for applicants who were never
issued an employment authorization was lessened by this amendment. As it now
stands, applicants have approximately nine months after becoming eligible for
the program to obtain an employment authorization and to complete their six
months of employment. The six months need not be consecutive and can include
volunteer work, part-time work or self employment, as long as the work was
performed under a valid employment authorization. Although generous in some
respects, the employment landing requirement still presents a problem for
women who are caring for their children and cannot get daycare in order to find
employment, and others who simply cannot find employment.
DROC applications must be submitted within 120 days of eligibility and Canada
Immigration is inflexible about the deadline. Routine fees are applicable to
DROC applications, that is, a $500 processing fee and the $975 Right of Landing
fee. As discussed above, these fees pose a hardship for people of low income
who are otherwise eligible for favourable consideration.
Finally, although the DROC program is not time limited, it seems clear that there
will be fewer and fewer people eligible for DROC over time. The guidelines
discriminate against claimants who applied to the Federal Court on or after July
7, 1994. For those failed claimants, the three years is counted from the date the
stay of the removal order expires, or the date the Federal Court renders its
decision, not the date their refugee claim was rejected. The combination of this
requirement and Immigration's stepped-up removals policy will make the Class
inaccessible to most failed claimants, except those from countries to which
Immigration has declared a moratorium on removals.
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF HUMANITARIAN AND COMPASSIONATE
DECISIONS
1) The Content of the Duty of Fairness
When an applicant applies to Immigration for landing on the basis of humani-
tarian and compassionate considerations and is refused, no statutory right of
appeal exists. One must resort to proceedings for judicial review, with leave of
the Federal Court, 17 and can succeed by demonstrating that there has been a
breach of the duty of fairness. Over the years the Federal Court has attempted
to define the factors which affect the fairness of a decision, making it reviewable
in a judicial review proceeding. Cases such as Johal v. Minister of Employment
17. Ibid. at s. 82.1(1).
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& Immigration,8 Kaur et al. v. Minister of Employment & Immigration,19
Muliadi v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration),20 Thorne and The
Minister of Employment and Immigration,2 1 and Ramoutar v. Canada22 held
that the content of the duty of fairness required knowledge of the case to be met,
and an opportunity to respond to reasons for a refusal by the Immigration officer.
In June of 1994, in a short oral decision from the bench, Mr. Justice Hugessen,
speaking for the Federal Court of Appeal, rendered a decision in Syed Shah v.
Minister of Employment and Immigration2 3 which set the content of the duty of
fairness at a very minimal level when humanitarian and compassionate immigra-
tion applications are being considered. He stated:
The power to grant such exemption resides in subsection 114(2) of the Act.
The decision itself is wholly a matter of judgment and discretion and the
law gives the applicant no right to any particular outcome. In this respect it
differs from any other decisions, e.g. by a visa officer dealing with a spon-
sored application for landing, where the law establishes criteria which, if
met, give rise to certain rights.
In a case such as this one the applicant does not have a "case to meet" of
which he must be given notice; rather it is for him to persuade the decision-
maker that he should be given exceptional treatment and exempted from the
general requirements of the law. No hearing need be held and no reasons
need be given. The officer is not required to put before the applicant any
tentative conclusions she may be drawing from the material before her, not
even as to apparent contradictions that concern her. Of course, if she is
going to rely on extrinsic evidence, not brought forward by the applicant,
she must give him a chance to respond to such evidence. In the case of per-
ceived contradictions, however, the failure to draw them specifically to the
applicant's attention may go to the weight that should later be attached to
them but does not affect the fairness of the decision.
The Shah decision has now set the standard against which all humanitarian and
compassionate applications under section 114(2) are being measured.
18. 4 Imm.L.R. (2d) 105.
19. 5 Imm. L. R. (2d) 148.
20. (1986), 18 Admin. L.R. 243.
21. (11 March, 1993), No. T-2652-91 (F.C.T.D.).
22. [1993] 3 F.C. 370.
23. (1994), 170 N.R. 238.
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2) Factual Basis for the Decision
Despite the outcome in Shah, on the facts of this case as they were found in the
Federal Court Trial Division, it appears that the applicant had benefited from a
substantial degree of fairness in the consideration of his case. He was granted a
second interview with a new interpreter, had the benefit of counsel, and both he
and his wife were given ample opportunity to explain the discrepancies in their
previous answers. 24 With this factual background it is hardly surprising that the
application for Judicial Review was dismissed by Jerome, A.C.J.
The Shah decision is an example of bad facts making for bad law. The facts
revealed a significant degree of procedural fairness accorded to the applicant.
The legacy of the case, however, has not been confined to these facts. In Shah,
the Federal Court of Appeal makes far reaching general statements, which
appear intended to apply to all similar cases.
3) The Meaning of Extrinsic Evidence
In a number of decisions since Shah, the Trial Division has commented on the
meaning of "extrinsic evidence". The reliance upon "extrinsic evidence" by an
immigration officer provides the most significant exception to the minimal
standard imposed by the court. Mr. Justice Gibson in Adolfo J. Garcia v. The
Minister of Employment and Immigration,2 5 found that a handwritten note made
by an immigration officer on a file, which purported to record the results of an
interview with the applicant was:
... extrinsic evidence, not brought forward by the Applicant for the pur-
poses of this application. The note was not prepared by the Applicant. There
is no evidence that it was ever seen by the Applicant. It was not part of the
material submitted by him for consideration on his application for visa ex-
emption. There is no reason to believe that he was even aware of its exis-
tence.
Mr. Justice Rothstein in the case of Dasent v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
& Immigration)26 has provided the most comprehensive examination of the
nature of extrinsic evidence. His analysis presents a rationale for his categori-
zation, as well as his conclusions. In characterizing contradictory statements by
the two spouses, made in separate interviews, as "extrinsic evidence" he pro-
vides us with clear guidelines for other cases:
24. Shah v. Minister of Employment and Immigration [1992] F.C.J. No. 406 (QL).
25. (December 12, 1994), No. IMM-3574-93, (Fed. T.D.).
26. (December 8, 1994), No. IMM-5386-93, (Fed. T.D.) see also Sorkhabi v. Canada (Sec-
retary of State), 26 Imm.L.R. (2d) 287.
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I interpret the term "extrinsic evidence not brought forward by the appli-
cant" as evidence of which the applicant is unaware because it comes from
an outside source. This would be evidence of which the applicant has no
knowledge and on which the immigration officer intends to rely in making
a decision affecting the applicant. While this would include information ob-
tained from an outside party as in Muliadi, I fail to see why it would not
also include evidence from a spouse obtained separately from the applicant,
or other information in the immigration file that did not come from the ap-
plicant, of which the applicant could not reasonably be expected to have
knowledge.
The relevant point as I see it is whether the applicant had knowledge of the
information so that he or she had the opportunity to correct prejudicial mis-
understandings or misstatements. The source of the information is not of it-
self a differentiating matter as long as it is not known to the applicant. The
question is whether the applicant had the opportunity of dealing with the
evidence. This is what the long-established authorities indicate the rules of
procedural fairness require.
It appears from these decisions that the Trial Division has taken a common-sense
and liberal approach to the interpretation of the exception in Shah, permitting
considerable leeway for counsel to argue for the inclusion of different fact
situations within the "extrinsic evidence" exception.
4) Can Shah be Confined to Similar Fact Situations?
Of significant importance is whether Shah limits the content of the duty of
fairness for all humanitarian and compassionate applications under section
114(2), regardless of the basis of the application. In Garcia, Mr. Justice Gibson
sought to distinguish Shah from the facts in the case before him, to find that
while both applications were made under section 114(2) of The Immigration
Act, they were very different:
This is not a "bone fide marriage" based application, but, as indicated ear-
lier, an application based upon what would appear to me, at least, to be a
subjectively well founded fear of return to Nicaragua, documented psychi-
atric considerations, and effective attachment to Canada through study,
training and community support rather than through marriage. 27
Reasoning that in Shah, Mr. Justice Hugessen had limited his decision to "a case
such as this one", the Court in Garcia found that Shah did not apply because of
the different factual basis. Gibson, J. went further and certified the following
question:
27. Supra, note 25 at 6.
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When considering the content of the "duty of fairness" owed to an Appli-
cant in subsection 114(2) applications under the Immigration Act, does the
decision in Syed Shah v. The Minister of Employment and Immigration
apply only in respect of cases with a similar fact basis, or does it apply to
all visa exemption applications under subsection 114(2) or, more specific-
ally, where such applications are based upon a subjective fear of removal to
the Applicant's country of citizenship, on psychiatric fragility and on al-
leged effective integration into Canada that is supported by substantial evi-
dence provided by the Applicant?
The Minister did not appeal Garcia, so the question of the ambit of Shah remains
unanswered by the Federal Court of Appeal. However, Gibson, J's reasoning in
Garcia is consistent with other higher court decisions which have found that the
duty of fairness varies according to the circumstances, and the seriousness of
the consequences to the applicant. 28 Unfortunately, this approach has not been
followed in reviews of negative PDRCC decisions where the Federal Court is
applying the "minimal standard of fairness" test set out in Shah 29. Arguably,
PDRCC applications also warrant a higher standard than that applied in marriage
applications under s. 114(2), as they address serious issues such as risk to life
or inhumane treatment.
D. REFUGEE ISSUES
1) Change of Country Conditions
For several years, the issue of how the IRB should deal with cases involving a
change in country conditions has been "debated" in the Federal Court. Article
1 C of the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,
one of the cessation clauses, is incorporated into subsection 2 (2) of the
Immigration Act. It states that:
A person ceases to be a Convention refugee when the reasons for the
person's fear of persecution in the country the person left, or outside of
which the person remained, cease to exist.30
In refugee hearings, the issue generally arises where there has been some
significant change in a country after the departure of the refugee claimant. The
28. see Nicholson v. Haldimond-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police
[1979] 1 S.C.R. 311.
29. see for example, Vetoshkin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) [1995]
F.C.J. No. 921 (QL); Klair v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) [1995]
F.C.J. No. 935 (QL).
30. Supra, note 9, s. 2 (2) (e).
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judicial controversy concerns the type of analysis required to deal with a change
in country conditions. Specifically, is it necessary for the tribunal to apply what
has become known as the "Hathaway Test." Professor James C. Hathaway posits
that for the cessation clause to be applicable, the change in country conditions
must be "meaningful ... truly effective ... (and) durable". 3 1
In January 1995, the Federal Court of Appeal effectively curtailed the vigorous
discussions on the issue of changed country conditions by its brief, but strongly
worded decision in the case of Sofia Mohamed Yusuf v. Canada (Minister of
Employment & Immigration).32
The Court in Yusuf makes it clear that consideration by the Refugee Board of
the criteria set out by Hathaway is not a requirement in determining whether
there has been a change of country conditions. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice
Hugessen states:
We would add that the issue of so-called "changed circumstances" seems to
be in danger of being elevated, wrongly in our view, into a question of law
when it is, at bottom, simply one of fact. A change in the political situation in a
claimant's country of origin is only relevant if it may help in determining
whether or not there is, at the date of the hearing, a reasonable and objectively
foreseeable possibility that the claimant will be persecuted in the event of return
there. That is an issue for factual determination and there is not a separate legal
"test" by which any alleged change of circumstances must be measured. The
use of words such as "meaningful", "effective" or "durable" is only helpful if
one keeps clearly in mind that the only question, and therefore the only test,
is that derived from the definition of Convention refugee in section 2 of the
Act: does the claimant now have a well-founded fear of persecution? 33
Since the release of Yusuf, the reasoning of Hugessen J.A. has been followed in
at least nine Federal Court Trial Division cases and two Federal Court of Appeal
decisions. 34 In most cases, the appellate court has accepted that a change of
31. James C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991) at pp.
199-203.
32. (January 9, 1995), No. A-130-92 (Fed. C.A.).
33. Ibid. at 1.
34. Manorath v. Canada (M.C.I.) (January 26, 1995), No. IMM-2369-94, (Fed. T.D.);
Gogo v. Canada (M.C..) (February 1, 1995), No. IMM-276-94, (Fed. T.D.); Agyekum
v. Canada (M.C.I.) (January 30, 1995), No. IMM-2069-94, (Fed. T.D.); Padilla v. Can-
ada (M.C.L) (March 6, 1995), No. IMM-2723-94, (Fed. T.D.); Nossevitch v. Canada
(M.C.L) (March 8, 1995), No. IMM-484-94, (Fed. T.D.); Ofori v. Canada (M.C.I.)
(March 14, 1995), No. IMM-3312-94, (Fed. T.D.); Hussain v. Canada (M. C.I.) (March
31, 1995), No. IMM-1495-92, (Fed. T.D.); Khouri v. Canada (M.C.L) (June 7, 1995),
No. A-506-92, (Fed. C.A.); Stefanov v. Canada (M.C.L) (July 24, 1995), No. A-1390-
92, (Fed. T.D.); Terarer-Ahmed v. Canada (M.E.L) (March 30, 1995), No. A-400-92,
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country circumstances is merely a finding of fact and, therefore, is reluctant to
intervene unless the determination is "truly erroneous". 35
A different analysis of the issue of change of country conditions can be found
in the Federal Court of Appeal decisions of Ahmed v Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration)36 and Cuadra v Canada (Solicitor General),37
both written by Mr. Justice Marceau. Although a determination of whether
circumstances have changed to the degree that a refugee claimant would no
longer be at risk can be characterized as a finding of fact, it is not, as Marceau
J.A. states in Ahmed, "a mere finding of fact drawn directly from the evi-
dence."'38 Such a finding is not the same, for example, as a determination that a
certain event took place on a particular day. Rather, for a Board to reach a
conclusion that there has been a change of country conditions such that it negates
the well-founded fear of the claimant "the evidence has to be interpreted and
inferences must be drawn from it". 39
In Ahmed, Marceau J.A. states that evidence of change of country conditions has
to be interpreted "in relation to legal concepts and provisions of law."40 In other
words, it cannot simply be considered in a vacuum. In that case, the IRB expressed
its finding regarding change of country conditions in a short paragraph, stating:
With a change of govemment in Bangladesh, the panel does not find the
claimant to have a well-founded fear of persecution should he return to
Bangladesh today.4 1
In his review of this decision, Mr. Justice Marceau made it clear that a deeper
analysis was required. Moreover, the finding of fact had to be made within an
analytical framework, such as that described by Hathaway. According to
Marceau J.A., the evidence had to provide a "clear indication of the meaningful
and effective change which is required to expunge the objective foundation of
the appellant's claim." 42
(Fed. C.A.).
35. Manorath, supra, note 34 at 4.
36. (July 14, 1993), No. A-89-92, (Fed. C.A.).
37. (July 20, 1993), No. A-179-92 (Fed. C.A.).
38. Supra, note 36 at 7.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid. at 6.
42. Ibid.
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The decisions of Marceau J.A. in Ahmed and Cuadra are in contrast to the
approach taken by Hugessen J.A. in Yusuf. Curiously, although made by the
same level of Court as Yusuf the reasoning of Marceau J.A. in those earlier
decisions has been ignored in recent caselaw.
In spite of Yusuf, the recent case of Tutu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)43 shows that, in decisions based on a change of country conditions,
the findings of the IRB are not completely impervious to review. In that case Mr.
Justice Cullen refers to Yusuf, and acknowledges that "a reviewing Court should be
very hesitant to interfere in factual assessments."44 That being said, however, Cullen
J. found that the Board's factual finding of change of country conditions "resulted
from a serious misreading of the evidence."' 45 He states:
... when the old regime's policies are still very much in force - even though
there may have been changes - the Board must, at least, consider the con-
tradicting evidence. It is not for this Court to weigh evidence; that is the
Board's prerogative. But when it is patently clear that the Board has not
weighed the evidence, a finding from that evidence will be erroneous and
subject to judicial review.46
The decision in Tutu provides a glimmer of hope for counsel whose clients have
been affected by a negative IRB decision based on a finding that there has been
a change of country conditions. Where there is evidence that conditions have
not changed - at least in regard to the particular circumstances of the claimant
- the Board is bound to consider and weigh such evidence in making its decision.
2) Internal Flight Alternative
In Yusuf, the Federal Court of Appeal also dealt with the issue of internal flight
alternative ("IFA"). The problem in the decision is not how the Court applied
IFA, but that it did not apply the law regarding internal flight where it ought to
have done so.
The Applicant in Yusuf was a member of the Issaq clan, born and raised in
Hargeisa, in the north of Somalia. Although noting that Somalia was far from
being a settled country, and that fighting continued among the various Somali
clans in the south and central regions of the country, the IRB found that in the
north, the situation was more stable. In the view of the Board, the claimant could
return to Hargeisa without fear of persecution.
43. [5 July, 1995] No. IMM-3762-94, (F.C.T.D.).
44. Ibid. at 8.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
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The Court held that "(t)his was not a case of an Internal Flight Alternative but
simply of the Board deciding, as a question of fact, that the appellant could safely
return to the very part of the country from which she had fled."
4 7
As in cases where there is an IFA, the claimant in Yusuf could live safely in only
one part of the country. The distinguishing feature in Yusuf is that the part of the
country where the Board found it safe for the claimant to live happened to be
the place where she was born and raised. The distinction, however, is illusory,
and the Court's analysis superficial.
In finding that this was not a case of Internal Flight Alternative, the Court in Yusuf
avoided the analysis required in an IFA case. In particular, there was no consider-
ation of whether it was "unreasonable" for the claimant to live in the city where she
was born. The avoidance of this issue was crucial, since it meant the Board did not
have to consider whether it was safe for the claimant to get to Hargeisa.
An IRB paper entitled Women in Somalia illustrates the dangers for women
travelling in Somali territory:
According to one analyst, moving [from one] to another area within Soma-
lia presents its own perils. Travelling internally at present is difficult, as it
requires money that most Somalis, especially women, do not have. The in-
frastructure is in disarray. Most importantly, says one analyst, one must at-
tempt to reach an area that is controlled by one's own clan; crossing
territory of another clan can be dangerous. For many Somalis, women in
particular, the only alternative available to remaining in an untenable situa-
tion is often to walk to one of the refugee camps located on the border of
Somalia ... [T]he director of the clinical psychology community pro-
gramme at Boston University, who is of Somali origin, stated that "Somali
women who return to Somalia to obtain documents run the risk of being
beaten, raped, imprisoned or even killed."48
Potentially, the Court's analysis in Yusuf is applicable to many Somali refugee
claimants, and persons coming from other war-torn countries. The problem
arises in situations where Boards consider it safe for persons to return to a
previously troubled home region, over which the claimant's clan or ethnic group
now exerts some measure of control. In such cases, Yusuf is authority for
decision-makers to by-pass issues of reasonableness and accessibility to that
region. For that reason, it is a troubling precedent.
47. Supra, note 32 at 2.
48. Immigration and Refugee Board, Women in Somalia, (Ottawa: IRB Information and
Research Branch, April 1994) at 20.
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3) Special Inquiry Model at the Convention Refugee Determination
Division ("CRDD")
With the institution of the "Special Inquiry Model" in October 1995, the IRB will
significantly change the way in which it deals with refugee claims. Under the new
procedures, Refugee Claim Officers ("RCOs") formerly known as Refugee Hearing
Officers, will work much more closely with Board members. Well before the
hearing of the refugee claim, the RCO and presiding panel member will meet to
review and analyze the claim in an effort to identify the issues to be addressed, any
special circumstances of the claimant, the need to acquire additional information,
and the existence of possible exclusion issues. RCOs will no longer be independent
researchers. The research will now be directed by the Board.
Aside from publicly available information, panels will now regularly receive a
package of information from Citizenship & Immigration, including the report
of the Immigration officer at the port-of-entry. All public source information as
well as any materials derived from Citizenship and Immigration must be
disclosed to the claimant and his or her counsel. In addition, the panel, with
input from the RCO, may request special source information on the particular
history of the claimant, or issues specific to the claim. This information is
obtained from sources that are not readily accessible to the public, such as
experts or Canadian diplomatic sources abroad. Before such information can be
sought, the claimant and/or counsel must be provided with a draft form,
describing the information being sought, why it is being sought, the source and
methodology of the search, as well as the estimated cost. An opportunity will
be given to the claimant/counsel to respond to the research being proposed.
The primary objective of the new procedural model is to have better informed
and better prepared panels. At the moment they enter the hearing room, presiding
panel members will have had months to consider the issues, and the documen-
tary evidence. In addition, Board members, as well as RCOs, will be assigned
to Case Management Teams, which will concentrate on certain geographic
regions. It is hoped that, in this way, Board members will acquire expertise in
these countries, thereby further improving the quality of decision-making.
Guidelines for meetings held in the absence of counsel or the claimant and
relating to the conduct of Board member and RCOs have been drafted. Members
must not solicit, nor may RCOs offer, any comment on the merits of a claim, or
the weight to be given to any evidence or conclusions of fact. Moreover, a
written summary "capturing the essence"49 of communications between the
RCO and panel is to be provided to the claimant and/or counsel.
49. Immigration and Refugee Board, Instructions Governing Extra-Hearing Communica-
tions Between Members of the Refugee Division and Refugee Claims Officers, (Ottawa:
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Board participants have been trained on the principles of fundamental justice and
the distinction between the role of the IRB member "as examiner and decision-
maker" and that of the RCO "as assistant and advisor to the decision-maker". 50
Certainly, the new procedural model has its positive attributes. For example, the
earlier disclosure of documents and identification of issues should result in more
focussed, shorter hearings. Board panels are likely to be better prepared and
more informed on country conditions than has often been the case in the past.
That being said, and in spite of the precautions being taken by the Board, several
aspects of the new procedure raise serious concerns. The IRB has labelled the
new procedure the "Special Inquiry Model", and points out that "[t]he refugee
determination process is essentially an inquiry into the circumstances surround-
ing a claim to Convention refugee status. ' 5 1 As well, in documents used to train
Board members in the new procedures, the IRB notes that its members "enjoy
broad powers of commissioners appointed under the Inquiries Act to direct the
gathering of information relevant to the assessment of claims to Convention
refugee status."'52
There is, however, an important distinction between an inquiry, as defined in
the Inquiries Act, and a refugee determination. Under the Inquiries Act, com-
missioners are appointed to "investigate and report ' 53 to the Minister or Gov-
emor-in-Council. IRB members, on the other hand, are decision-makers, not
investigators. They act independently, reporting to no one. A close relation with
board counsel is essential to a commissioner sitting on a board of inquiry. One
questions, however, the appropriateness of such a close working relationship
between board counsel and an impartial decision-maker.
Even without specifically commenting on the merits of a claim, an experienced
RCO can influence the direction of a Board's inquiries, and colour a panel's
perception of a claimant. In itself this is not a bad thing. The concern is that such
influence will be made in the absence of the claimant and/or counsel. Should the
new system work flawlessly, any inappropriate comments made in closed sessions
would be communicated to counsel and, therefore, potentially countered. Unfor-
tunately, not all claimants have the benefit of counsel. Moreover, no system
IRB, September 1995) at 6.
50. Ibid. at 2.
51. Immigration and Refugee Board, The Role of the Members in Refugee Determination,
(Ottawa: IRB, September 1995) at 1.
52. Ibid. at 1.
53. Inquiries Act, R.S.C., c. 1-13, s. 6.
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which is conducted by human beings ever works flawlessly. Inevitably, errors
in judgment and performance will occur.
There already exist rules of law and procedure governing the conduct of Boards in
IRB hearings, but this does not mean that there is always adherence to such rules.
The difference between Board hearings and closed communications between panel
members and RCOs is that the former are recorded and thereby monitored. The
latter work on the honour system. Quaere whether, in a procedure which potentially
affects the life, liberty and security of each claimant, the lack of a monitoring system
is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice?
These concerns are accentuated when one contemplates the government's an-
nouncement, made in early 1995, that it intends to reduce refugee panels from
two members to one. This proposal alone will reduce the quality of decision-
making. At present, weaker, less experienced Board members are often placed
on panels with their stronger, more experienced colleagues. Such a balance will
be missing with single-member panels. Moreover, the influence of an experi-
enced RCO will be increased in in camera sessions with one member.
Another concern with the Special Inquiry Model is that the time spent with the
file prior to meeting the claimant in the hearing room will make it more difficult
for Board members to keep an open mind about each case. In a judicial or
quasi-judicial proceeding, extensive pre-hearing discussion between the parties
is an excellent way to isolate issues and define the focus of the hearing. This
system works well in civil trials. There is one significant difference, however,
between a civil trial and the Special Inquiry Model being instituted in refugee
claims. In civil proceedings, the judge who presides over pre-hearing matters is
not the judge who ultimately hears the evidence and decides the case. That
decision-maker has had no opportunity to formulate pre-conceived ideas about
the case before he/she begins to hear any evidence. In the Special Inquiry Model
of the Refugee Board, the same members who deal with pre-hearing procedures
also hear the evidence and make the decision. For them, opportunities to form
pre-conceived notions abound.
At the time of writing, the new procedural model has yet to take effect, and the
concerns raised in this paper are, therefore, theoretical. One will have to see if,
in practice, the positive aspects of the new procedure outweigh those which are
potentially negative.
E. ACCESS TO JUSTICE
The Charter under section 24(1) guarantees
Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have
been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction
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to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the cir-
cumstances.54
On reading the guarantee, one would assume that Charter issues could be raised
before Immigration tribunals, within ongoing Federal Court applications, as
well as in provincial superior courts. The provincial superior court alternative
is particularly important in the immigration context because access to the
Federal Court is contingent upon being granted leave for the review of almost
all immigration decisions. 55
In Reza v. The Queen in Right of Canada et al.,56 the applicant was determined
not to have a "credible-basis" to his refugee claim under the now repealed
section 46.02(1) of the Immigration Act. He sought leave to appeal the "credi-
ble-basis" decision in the Federal Court, which was denied. Several humanitar-
ian and compassionate applications were subsequently made to Immigration
officers, all of which were rejected, and leave to commence a judicial review of
the last Immigration officer's decision in the Federal Court, Trial Division was
refused. After exhausting all appeal and review processes available in the
Federal Court, the claimant brought an application in the Ontario Court (General
Division) for injunctive relief and a declaration that his Charter rights had been
violated. The application made direct challenges to the constitutionality of the
credible-basis hearing under section 7 of the Charter; the leave requirement in
immigration cases to commence judicial review in the Federal Court; and the
application of certain of the transitional provisions.
In a move which preempted the consideration of the Charter issues raised,
however, the motions judge declined to exercise his jurisdiction and stayed the
entire application. At the heart of his decision was a finding that the Federal
Court had concurrent jurisdiction to grant the relief requested, and that it was
no less advantageous for the claimant to seek his remedy in the Federal Court.
The claimant appealed the stay of his application to the Court of Appeal for
Ontario.
Madame Justice Arbour, speaking for the majority of the Ontario Court of
Appeal, allowed the appeal and held that the applicant should have the right to
choose in cases where both courts have full concurrent jurisdiction. She went
54. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
55. The only exception is the judicial review of a visa officer's decision which can com-
mence as of right pursuant to section 82.1(2) of The Immigration Act.
56. (1992), 11 O.R. (3d) 65, 58 O.A.C. 377, 98 D.L.R. (4th) 88, 11 C.R.R. (2d) 213, 9
Admin. L.R. 121.
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further and found that the leave requirement in the Federal Court was a juridical
disadvantage, making the application as of right in the Ontario court more
advantageous to the applicant. This decision allowed failed refugee claimants
an alternative forum if Charter issues were raised. This was particularly import-
ant in cases where all Federal Court remedies had been exhausted.
In a decision released by the Supreme Court of Canada in April of 1994, Madame
Justice Arbour's decision was overturned. The Court found that, notwithstand-
ing the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ontario Court (General Division) and the
Federal Court to hear the application, the motions judge properly exercised his
discretion to stay the Ontario Court proceedings because "Parliament had
created a comprehensive scheme of review of immigration matters and the
Federal Court was an effective and appropriate forum". 57 While there is an
acknowledgement of the availability of a choice of forum for constitutional
challenges in general, the decision effectively forecloses the choice for immigra-
tion cases, by the blanket finding that there is a comprehensive scheme already
in place in the Federal Court.
The Court agreed in general with the dissenting reasons of Abella J.A. at the
Court of Appeal, but did not address the issue of the leave requirement being a
"juridical disadvantage".
The effects of Reza are already being felt in the lower courts. In Baroud v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),58 a refugee claimant was
detained on a security certificate issued under s. 40.1 of the Immigration Act.
While the review of security certificates provides for a hearing into the reason-
ableness of the certificate by a Federal Court Judge, there is no provision for an
application for release from detention. The claimant commenced an application
for a writ of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid in the Ontario Court (General
Division), which was refused at first instance on the basis of the Reza decision.
In disposing of the appeal Carthy, J.A., having examined the remedies available
in the General Division and the Federal Court, and the practical timing of any
hearings in both, concluded that:
the trial procedure in the Federal Court is an adequate and effective alterna-
tive remedy which provides relief to the appellant in a forum where pro-
ceedings relating to the appellant's detention are in progress.59
57. Reza v Canada,[1994] S.C.J. No. 49 (QL) at 23.
58. 28 Imm.L.R. (2d) 123.
59. Ibid. at 127.
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Having come to this conclusion, the Court then proceeded to dispose of the
section 10 Charter arguments which had been raised. Section 10 mandates that
10. Everyone has the right on arrest or detention
(c) to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas corpus
and to be released if the detention is not lawful.
Despite the mandatory wording of section 10, Carthy J.A. found that the
guarantee did not apply:
... the answer is an obvious one when s.1 of the Charter is applied. Once
there is a finding that an alternative remedy is equally effective it is axiom-
atic that the denial of the right to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a
justifiable limit. There is no real loss and s.1 serves its proper purpose of
modifying what would otherwise be absolute rights where there is demon-
strable justification.60
It is questionable if the alternative remedy was, in fact, equally effective on the
facts of the Baroud case, and more important if it would always be equally
effective. The Federal Court review of the certificate could take significantly
longer than a habeas corpus application and the Minister can, for security
reasons, refuse to grant the claimant access to the materials upon which a
decision is based. The secrecy surrounding the issuance and review of security
certificates raises some doubts as to the effectiveness of the alternative rem-
edy. 6 1
Despite the outcome, the decision in Baroud endorses the principle that each
case should be determined after a consideration of the particular facts. The
Court, by embarking on a comparison of the relative merits of each forum, leaves
open the possibility that, in certain circumstances, the Federal Court alternative
may not be equally advantageous to the applicant and a proceeding could be
commenced in a provincial superior court.
The limiting of Charter remedies for immigrants by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Reza is the most recent in a series of Superior Court Cases in which
the result has been an erosion of immigrant rights. In Ruparel v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration)62 the Federal Court held that the
Charter does not apply to visa officer decisions abroad; in Canada (Secretary
60. Ibid. at 129.
61. See section 40.1(4) of the Immigration Act for a review of the in camera proceedings
and the treatment of security or criminal intelligence reports, and information obtained
in confidence from foreign governments.
62. [1990] F.C.J. No. 701 (QL).
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of State for External Affairs) v. Menghani 63 the Federal Court found that
remedies are not available under the Canadian Human Rights Act for im-
migrants; and in Chiarelli v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigra-
tion),6 4 the Supreme Court found that the mandatory deportation of persons
convicted of serious criminal offenses who are subject to security intelligence
review committee hearings does not breach section 7 of the Charter or the
principles of fundamental justice.
F. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
1. Bill C-44
Media publicity surrounding the death of Constable Todd Bayliss and the "Just
Desserts" shooting in Toronto led to a public outcry about perceived abuses in
the immigration and refugee system. Questions were asked as to why reprieves
from deportation were granted by the Immigration and Refugee Board to
permanent residents who were criminals, under circumstances which were
difficult for the public to understand. Other perceived abuses, including lengthy
delays in removing people from Canada and other problems of immigration
enforcement came to light at approximately the same time. These events
provided the political impetus for the federal government to enact Bill C-44, an
enforcement bill which significantly limits access to the refugee and appeals
system for criminals and others whom the government believes to be security
risks. Royal assent was given June 15th, 1995 and the amendments to the
Immigration Act, the Citizenship Act and The Customs Act contained in Bill C-44
came into force on July 10, 1995.65
Bill C-44 was only one part of a four-pronged government response to the
perceived problems. Other announcements made simultaneously included the
following:
1. Changes in the management at the Immigration Appeal Division and the
appointment of Nancy Goodman as the Deputy Chairperson.
2. Coordination between the Department of Immigration and Correctional
Services of Canada for the exchange of parole and release dates of fed-
eral offenders.
63. [1993] F.C.J. No. 1287 (QL).
64. Imm L.R. (2d) 1.
65. Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1995, c.15.
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3. The establishment of national guidelines for intervention in refugee cases
involving war criminals, multiple identities and patterns of fraud. 66
In making a public commitment to give top priority to the removal of criminals,
the Minister announced the creation of a special task force composed of both
RCMP and immigration officers. The task force was charged with clearing the
more than 600 permanent residents convicted of serious criminal offenses, who
were backlogged in the removal process. The stepped-up removal of these
people, some whom have been in Canada for almost all of their lives, was
probably the most visible immigration news story over the last year.
2. Restricted Access to Refugee Division
Changes to the Immigration Act in 1993 made under Bill C-86 restricted access
to the refugee process by excluding from the process persons convicted of
serious criminal offences, either inside or outside of Canada. Because of the
wording of section 46.01(1)(e), the exclusion applied only to people making
refugee claims who were not permanent residents. Thus, with the most recent
amendments, the restriction has been extended to permanent residents. Where
permanent residents have been found to be described under section 27(1)a. I (i)
and 27(1)(d) they will no longer be eligible to make a refugee claim. These are
people who have been convicted of offences in Canada that bear a maximum
punishment of ten years or more, or who have received a sentence of more than
six months. In either case, the Minister must be of the opinion that the person
constitutes a "danger to the public" in Canada.67 In passing these amendments,
the government hoped to prevent landed immigrants who are convicted of
serious criminal offenses from delaying their removal by making refugee
claims.
The effectiveness of section 46.01(1)(e) was originally limited to criminality
actually existing or known to exist at the time of the eligibility hearing. In cases
where criminal convictions are committed or come to light after referral of the
refugee claim to the Refugee Division, provisions now exist for the suspension
of the Board's consideration of the refugee case upon notification by a senior
immigration officer of the criminality. 68 These changes allow the criminality
exclusion to be applied to refugee cases currently pending before the Refugee
Division, making the issue of eligibility and access to the Immigration and
Refugee Board an ongoing issue in all refugee cases.
66. Statement, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 17 June 1994.
67. S.O.C. 1995, C.15 s.9. [hereinafter S.O.C.]
68. Ibid. at s.11.(1).
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3. Limited Access to Immigration Appeal Division
Limitations have also been placed on the right of appeal to the Immigration
Appeal Division. Where section 40.1(1) security certificates have been filed,
and the certificate has been found to be reasonable under section 40.1(4)(d) by
a Federal Court Judge, there is no longer an appeal to the Appeal Division.69
The amendments remove the appeal on questions of law or fact, or mixed law
and fact which existed under the previous section 70(4).
Permanent residents and Convention refugees who are inadmissible because
they fall within the security exclusions in sections 19(1)(e), (f), (g), (j) or (1)70
no longer have a right to an appeal on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.
Further, if the Minister is of the opinion that the person is a danger to the public
in Canada, and an adjudicator has found them to be inadmissible because of
criminality under sections 19(1 )(c), (c. 1) (c.2) or (d), or in the case of permanent
residents removable under section 27(1) (a) (a. 1) or 27(1)(d), there is no appeal
at all.
Still unclear is the process which the Minister uses to make his security
determinations, or the standard being applied. The term "danger to the public"
is an undefined standard, not having been addressed in the Immigration Act, the
Immigration Regulations, or by policy. From a procedural perspective, it ap-
pears that there is no right to counsel and no disclosure of the material being
relied upon by the Minister to make these decisions. In some instances, people
are being sent letters advising them that their case is being reviewed to determine
if they are a "danger to the public". They are then given fifteen days to make
submissions and to advance any humanitarian and compassionate grounds. In
other cases, the Minister is reviewing the files of perfected appeals in the Appeal
Division, and decisions are being made, often without the input or even knowl-
edge of the person until the day of the hearing.
Needless to say, the removal of the appeal on equitable grounds for refugees and
permanent residents in some circumstances raises serious concerns. One can
69. Ibid. at s.13.(1).
70. Section 19(1)(e) of the Immigration Act relates to spies and terrorists and members of
terrorist organizations who might try to act in Canada;(f) relates to those in (e) who have engaged in such acts;
(g) relates to people whom there are grounds to believe will engage in acts
of violence, or who are members of an organization likely to engage
in acts of violence;
(i) relates to war criminals;
(1) relates to senior officials of governments engaged in terrorism or
systematic or gross human rights violations, or war crimes, or crimes
against humanity.
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project that some people will be removed for criminal violations which provide
a severe maximum penalty, but which, in the circumstances of their case, merited
only a very minimal criminal sentence. Others will be removed despite a long period
of residence in Canada and a substantial connection to this country. It is important
to remember that a foreign criminal conviction is not always proof that a person
engaged in the activity, particularly when the conviction arises in a country
which does not respect fair trial standards or the presumption of innocence. 71
More alarming, however, are cases where convictions arise in countries where
criminal charges are used as a means to arrest and detain political dissidents.
Iran, which has a documented history of arresting people on trumped-up crim-
inal charges when their actual "offences" are political, is an excellent example. 72
Refugee claimants caught by the criminality provisions, either through trumped-
up criminal charges, the interrelation between the criminal offence and the
refugee claim, or as a result of convictions arising from a process which violates
all internationally accepted standards, will have no opportunity to state their
case or be heard, in circumstances where their removal may pose a real risk to
their life or safety.
The new section 46.3 prohibits more than one claim being made by any person.
While clearly the intent of the section is to prevent multiple concurrent claims,
which are fraudulent attempts to manipulate the system, there is no distinction
made between these and legitimate claims which result from a change of country
circumstances since the denial of a previous claim. 73 The section appears to
encompass both situations. Claims are terminated and the decision made by the
Refugee Board is null and void on notification that a previous claim had been made,
no matter how long ago or under what circumstances the first claim was made.
In the past, citizenship was sometimes granted despite ongoing immigration
investigations and, once granted, prevented the removal of the person from
Canada.74 The new amendments will effectively prevent this from happening
as they include changes to the Citizenship Act which will suspend applications
71. See for example Amnesty International Report 1995, for countries where trial proce-
dures violate international standards, and convictions entered after "summary" trials. A
review of this publication suggests that a majority of the countries listed violate the in-
ternational fair trial standards.
72. United States Department of State, "Iran", in Country Reports on Human Rights Prac-
tices for 1994, February 1995 at 1. See also Encyclopedia of the Third World 1992,
"Iran" at 7., Human Rights Watch World Report 1994, Human Rights Watch at 290.
73. Supra, note67ats.l1(1)
74. Supra, note 9 at s. 4(1)
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for citizenship pending the outcome of any inquiry commenced under the
Immigration Act. 75
The Minister now has an overriding control of the process for permanent
residents, Convention refugees and visa holders, in that no appeal lies to the
Appeal Division if the Minister is of the opinion that the person constitutes a
danger to the public in Canada, and the person has been determined by an
adjudicator to be inadmissible or removable due to criminality.76 It is fair
comment that the Minister always had the right to participate in appeals from
deportation orders. What the Minister now has is not just the power to partici-
pate, but the power to decide in those cases where criminality is involved. Even
the responsibility for determining if a person has been rehabilitated has been
given to the Minister, a decision previously made by the Governor in Counsel.77
While it is clear that these amendments were enacted in response to the two high
profile events in the spring of 1994, it is not so clear that they will address the
public concerns which were raised at the time. The new system, which severely
limits appeal remedies for many permanent residents and refugee claimants,
may in fact do nothing to expedite the process of deportation. The removal of
the equitable jurisdiction of the Immigration Appeal Division in cases of serious
criminality will undoubtedly deny a person a ground of appeal, but not the appeal
process and hearing itself. It is, therefore, questionable how the removal of the
appeal ground can be justified on the basis of a speedier process. In an article
in Immigration & Citizenship by B.J. Caruso, 78 it is suggested that a far better,
more expeditious and cost-effective solution would be to grant jurisdiction to
criminal court judges to impose deportation orders as part of a criminal sentenc-
ing process. 79 It is hard to argue with such a proposal, particularly when the
sentencing process includes consideration of many of the factors which would
have been considered on a humanitarian and compassionate appeal, and which
are no longer grounds for leniency as a result of the recent changes.
G. CONCLUSION
With the coming to power of the Liberal government in October of 1993, there
were high hopes in the immigrant and refugee communities that positive
75. Supra, note 67 at s.23.
76. Ibid. at s. 13(1).
77. Ibid. at s. 2(1).
78. B.J. Caruso "A Few Bad Apples" (August 1995). 7 Imm.& Cit,. #6.
79. A private member's Bill is currently in second reading in the house which would do
this.
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changes would take place in the Department of Immigration and the Immigra-
tion and Refugee Board. This optimism was reinforced by the delivery of the
Waldman-Davis report, The Quality of Mercy, the introduction of the DROC
class and announced reforms to the PDRCC. Unfortunately, the programs
instituted by the new government have not lived up to expectations and it is clear
that government priorities remain focused on the attraction of skilled, educated
immigrants. Actions such as imposing the Right of Landing fee, stepping-up
removals and restricting appeal rights for permanent residents and refugees
reflect the government's decreasing concern for immigrants who do not meet
this profile. Meanwhile, there are plans at the IRB to create single member
refugee panels and institute a procedural model whose shortcomings may well
outweigh its benefits.
A mere two years after the election, there is no longer any serious discussion of
progressive change in the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration.
During the same period, Court decisions have limited the scope of judicial
review for humanitarian applicants, and for certain refugee claimants whose
claims are rejected. As well, courts have limited the access of immigrants to
Charter remedies. All of these changes have had a significant impact on low
income immigrants.
The scenario presented in this paper is, indeed, gloomy. The forecast, regretta-
bly, is equally dim. At the time of writing, the Ontario government is threatening
to eliminate legal aid funding for immigration. Should this occur, the consequent
denial of counsel could have a more profound effect on low-income immigrants
and refugees than any of the legislative changes, government policies or judicial
decisions already described.

